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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he Congress shall have
Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 Under this authority,
Congress has stated that a patent may be obtained for the invention
or discovery of “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”2
However, the Supreme Court has long held that laws of nature, natu-
ral phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.3 For example, a
newly discovered mineral or plant could not be patented.4 Nor could
Einstein’s law that E = mc2 or Newton’s law of gravity.5 These catego-
ries are not patentable because they are “the basic tools of scientific
and technological work,”6 and granting a patent of these tools might
“tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”7 At
the same time, courts are hesitant to construe these exclusions too
broadly because lack of patent protection might just as easily hamper
innovation.8
The courts have always toed the line between incentivizing innova-
tion and allowing public access to innovations as inspiration for future
inventions.9 The Supreme Court continued to toe this line in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,10 balancing
the categories of patent-ineligible subject matter with inventive con-
cepts that might transform them into patentable inventions.11 None-
theless, in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,12 the Federal
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. 62, 116 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
4. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
5. Id.
6. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
7. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“[A] process is not unpatent-
able simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.”);
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (“If there is to be invention from [the discovery of a
law of nature], it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new
and useful end.”).
9. See WILLIAM R. BALLARD, THERE IS NO MYSTERY ABOUT PATENTS 22 (1946) (“This
reservoir of knowledge is both an aid and an inspiration to anyone interested in
practicing or developing a particular art. And the knowledge that patents may be
obtained is a stimulation to the making of still more and more inventions and
disclosures.”).
10. 566 U.S. 66.
11. See infra section II.B.
12. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Circuit definitively tipped the scales in favor of public access, effec-
tively eliminating any incentive to innovate in the life sciences.13 By
implementing an overwhelmingly strict standard for inventive con-
cepts, the Federal Circuit expanded Mayo to be as broad as the jus-
tices feared its “sweeping language” to be.14 After Ariosa, the Federal
Circuit leaves life sciences innovation in dire straits, the consequences
of which are yet to be fully realized.
This Note explores the inventive concept as revitalized by Mayo
and attempts to refute the Federal Circuit’s misunderstanding of
Mayo. Part II.A lays out the relevant background, outlining the tradi-
tional understanding of patentable subject matter under § 101 and the
inventive concept. The discussion then turns to the Mayo test, with
the remainder of Part II endeavoring to navigate the murky waters of
Mayo and subsequent application of the Mayo standard by the courts.
In response to the Federal Circuit’s understanding of the inventive
concept in Ariosa, Part III discusses how—if at all—Mayo changed the
inventive concept, and why discovery of a law of nature must satisfy
it. Finally, this Note concludes with an examination of the conse-
quences and aftermath of Ariosa’s restrictive interpretation of the in-
ventive concept.
II. BACKGROUND
As interpreted today, the Patent Act does not authorize patent pro-
tection for laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.15
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized these exceptions to
patentability for more than 150 years.16 This Part begins with a dis-
cussion of how each exception is interpreted by the courts, carving out
areas of unpatentable subject matter without crossing the line into
removing incentives to invent. This Part goes on to discuss the frame-
work laid out by Mayo17 for analysis of patents directed at these tradi-
tionally unpatentable subject matters and the solidification of the
Mayo framework in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.18 Finally,
this Part relates the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and application
of the Mayo framework in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.19
13. See infra Part III.
14. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring); see infra section III.C.
15. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
16. Id.
17. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
18. Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347.
19. Ariosa, 788 F.3d 1371.
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A. Development of § 10120
The development of § 101 jurisprudence began even before its pas-
sage in 1952. It took hundreds of years to mold the categories of pat-
entable subject matter into what they are today, beginning with the
Patent Act of 1793.21 The 1793 Act identified invention of “any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement on [the same], not known or used before
application” as patentable subject matter.22 Although the Patent Act
has endured various iterations,23 these original classes of patentable
subject matter remain substantially similar in the text of § 101
today.24
1. Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena, and Abstract Ideas
Over this great period of time, the Supreme Court has wrestled
with how far patentability extends.25 The journey began with Le Roy
v. Tatham, in which the Court first excepted laws of nature from
patentability:
A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a mo-
tive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclu-
sive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be
discovered in addition to those already known.26
The Court expanded upon the invalidity of laws of nature the follow-
ing year in O’Reilly v. Morse.27 Morse dealt with the famous Samuel
Morse, who obtained a patent for his invention of the telegraph.28 In
the reissued patent, Mr. Morse claimed “the use of . . . electro-magnet-
ism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible charac-
ters, signs, or letters, at any distances . . . .”29 Although the Court
20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
21. 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
22. Id.
23. See generally Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the Light
of Comparative Law I, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 291–97 (1954).
24. See § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.”).
25. See generally Joshua A. Kresh, Patent Eligibility After Mayo: How Did We Get
Here and Where Do We Go?, 22 FED. CIR. B. J. 521, 522–30 (2013); William J.
Casey, Note, The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole: Why Courts Deter-
mining Subject Matter Eligibility Should Analyze the Patent-Eligible and Unpat-
entable Portions of the Claim Separately Instead of Treating the Claim as a
Whole, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 107, 110–16 (2013).
26. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
27. 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
28. Id. at 69, 78.
29. Id. at 112.
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found the claim to be void on other grounds,30 it stated that an inven-
tion that makes use of a principle such as electromagnetism is gener-
ally valid, so long as the patent does not claim the principle itself.31
The Court later clarified that an invention that makes use of a princi-
ple need not be a machine but may be simply a process.32
Over time, the Court also recognized the ineligibility of natural
phenomena for patent protection. This exception was first held in
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., in which the patent
claimed a mixed culture of Rhizobia bacteria that were capable of inoc-
ulating various seeds.33 The patentee did not invent the fact that vari-
ous species of Rhizobium were capable of producing a mixed inoculant
but rather discovered that natural phenomenon.34 Since the Court
could not allow a patent on “one of the ancient secrets of nature,” it
held the patent to be invalid.35 The Court later limited this holding,
noting that where a claim is to a “nonnaturally occurring manufacture
or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a dis-
tinctive name, character [and] use,’ ” patent protection is
appropriate.36
The Supreme Court has also made clear that abstract ideas are not
patent eligible.37 In invalidating a patent on a mathematical formula
for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary
numerals, the Court specifically stated that “one may not patent an
30. The Court found that this claim was void because it was too broad and would
inhibit innovation. See id. at 113.
31. See id. at 119; see also Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939) (“While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not [a] patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be.”).
32. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880) (upholding the validity of a patent
claiming the formation of fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of
water at a high temperature and pressure).
33. 333 U.S. 127, 129 (1948). There are at least six species of Rhizobium bacteria,
each of which will infect certain different pod-producing plants. Id. The tradi-
tional practice was to produce a substance containing one Rhizobium species
which would prevent infection of specific plants by certain other Rhizobium spe-
cies. Id. The patentee discovered that a mixture of Rhizobium species was effec-
tive in preventing disease across an array of plants. Id.
34. See id. at 132.
35. Id.
36. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (alteration in original)
(quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). The patentee in
Chakrabarty claimed the invention of a “human-made, genetically engineered
bacterium . . . capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.” Id. at
305. Because the patentee “produced a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature,” the Court found the microorganism
patentable. Id. at 310.
37. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609–12 (2010) (holding that a mathemat-
ical formula to hedge risk of price changes in the energy market was an unpatent-
able abstract idea).
226 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:221
idea.”38 The Court went further, noting that even post-solution activ-
ity—such as adjustment of alarm limits based on the outcome of a
formula—cannot be patent eligible.39 At the same time, an application
of an abstract idea is patentable, so long as the patent does not claim
the idea itself.40 Through well over a century of jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court has properly concluded that patent protection is not ap-
propriate when the invention is grounded in a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea.
2. The “Inventive Concept”
While laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
should generally be patent ineligible, the Supreme Court is also fear-
ful that the exclusions might “swallow all of patent law.”41 Thus,
where an invention falls in one of the three traditionally unpatentable
areas of subject matter, the Supreme Court has sometimes upheld a
patent that contains a sufficient “inventive concept.”42 The Court pro-
vided its first formulation of the inventive concept in Gottschalk v.
Benson.43 In Benson, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
issued a patent for an invention related to “ ‘the processing of data by
program and more particularly to the programmed conversion of nu-
merical information’ in general-purpose digital computers.”44 The pat-
ent claimed a method for converting binary-coded decimal numerals
into pure binary numerals.45 The claims purported to cover all such
uses in any general-purpose digital computer.46 The Court discussed
the necessary inventive concept for the claimed method to be patent
eligible, stating that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process
38. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
39. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“The notion that post-solution activity,
no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance. A competent
draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathe-
matical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or
partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final step indicat-
ing that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying
techniques. The concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not ‘like a
nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction . . . .’ ” (quoting
White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886))).
40. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
41. Id.
42. See Casey, supra note 25, for a discussion of the Court’s wavering between the
sufficiency of an inventive concept and the approach of interpreting the claim as a
whole.
43. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
44. Id. at 64.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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claim that does not include particular machines.”47 The Court went on
to provide examples of a sufficient transformation, including a
mechanical process for expanding metal and a process for setting eggs
in staged incubation with air currents.48 Importantly, the Court clari-
fied, “We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did
not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.”49 Rather, the
claim in Benson was ineligible for patent protection because it would
“wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”50
The Court provided more evidence of its understanding of the in-
ventive concept in Parker v. Flook.51 In Flook, the patent claimed a
method of updating alarm limits by making use of an algorithm.52 The
Court began by explaining that implementation of a principle in a pro-
cess does not automatically fall within the patentable subject matter
of § 101.53 The Court stated that the alarm limit method lacked an
inventive concept because each of its component parts was well-
known.54 Furthermore, the method for calculating alarm limits was
well-known, making the patent claim “comparable to a claim that the
formula 2pr can be usefully applied in determining the circumference
of a wheel.”55 The Court determined that post-solution activity such
as this lacks an inventive concept and thus cannot be patented.56
Benson and Flook make evident that there is no clear formula for
an inventive concept. Benson provided that high tempera-
ture–pressure systems to produce fatty acids, mechanical processes
for expanding metal, and use of air currents in staged egg incubation
47. Id. at 70. The Court cited Tilghman v. Proctor, which upheld the process of “man-
ufacturing fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a
high temperature and pressure” as an example of an inventive concept. Benson,
409 U.S. at 70 (quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 721 (1880)); see also
Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 729 (“The chemical principle or scientific fact upon which
it is founded is, that the elements of neutral fat require to be severally united
with an atomic equivalent of water in order to separate from each other and be-
come free. This chemical fact was not discovered by Tilghman. He only claims to
have invented a particular mode of bringing about the desired chemical union
between the fatty elements and water.”).
48. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70–71.
49. Id. at 71.
50. Id. at 72.
51. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
52. Id. at 585.
53. Id. at 593.
54. Id. at 594.
55. Id. at 595. The circumference is the distance around the outside of a shape. For a
circle, the circumference can be determined by multiplying half the distance
across the circle (the radius, r) by twice the value of pi (p). Pi is a constant value
equal to approximately 3.14 that is commonly used in mathematical formulas.
The value of pi is derived from this relationship between the radius and circum-
ference of a circle.
56. See id. at 590.
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sufficiently transform the invention into patentable subject matter.
Flook, meanwhile, added that merely providing a new method for cal-
culating alarm-limit values is not sufficient. Thus, the inventive con-
cept test appears to be quite subjective, preserving the requirement of
novelty57 and perhaps relying most strongly on avoiding preemp-
tion.58 The Court has made clear that laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas are not patentable, but it has been much more
obscure in attempting to define what qualifies as an inventive concept
sufficient to remove an invention from these categories and transform
it into a patentable invention.
B. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc.59
Decades after Benson and Flook, the Court returned to the inven-
tive concept in Mayo. This case established a more specific framework
for determining whether an invention aimed at unpatentable subject
matter is in fact patent eligible. This section lays out the background
of Mayo and goes on to outline the framework put forth by the Court.
As discussed in this section, the Mayo analysis requires that the
claims be directed at a patent-ineligible concept and that there be
some inventive concept sufficient to transform the claim into a patent-
able invention.60 This section concludes with an overview of the
court’s application of its new framework to the facts of Mayo.
1. Facts
Mayo arose as a challenge to a patent assigned to Hospital-Sainte-
Justine in 200261 for optimizing the treatment of immune-related gas-
trointestinal disorders such as inflammatory bowel disease (IBD).62
IBD generally occurs in young adults, with common symptoms of diar-
57. Id. at 591 (“The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be
new and useful.”).
58. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (“[I]f the judgment below is af-
firmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in prac-
tical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”). This is a logical place for
the Court to root its analysis, since preemption concerns provided the basis for
establishing the categories of patent-ineligible subject matter to begin with. See
supra section II.A.1.
59. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
60. Id. at 73–77.
61. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, at [73].
62. Id. at col. 1 ll. 19–22, col. 2 ll. 16–18. Inflammatory bowel disease encompasses
ulcerative colitis and Crohn’s disease. Both diseases are characterized by inflam-
mation of the digestive tract. Inflammatory bowel disease can be debilitating and
potentially life-threatening. Inflammatory Bowel Disease (IBD): Definition, MAYO
CLINIC (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/inflamma
tory-bowel-disease/basics/definition/CON-20034908 [https://perma.unl.edu/9YV9-
7VXC].
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rhea, abdominal pain, and fever.63 Physicians commonly prescribe thi-
opurine drugs for treatment of IBD.64 The body metabolizes the drugs,
forming metabolites in the bloodstream.65 Each patient metabolizes
thiopurines differently, so the same dose of a thiopurine drug can have
varied effects.66 A dosage that is too low for an individual can be inef-
fective for the patient,67 while a dosage that is too high can result in
harmful side effects.68 Previously, studies suggested that measure-
ment of certain metabolites could be used to predict the likelihood that
a particular dosage of a thiopurine drug could be harmful or helpful
for a particular patient.69 However, scientists did not know the exact
correlation between metabolite levels and efficacy or toxicity.70
The patents at issue,71 solely and exclusively licensed to Prome-
theus Laboratories, Inc. (Prometheus),72 embody findings of specific
concentrations of metabolite that indicate that a dosage is too high or
too low for a particular patient.73 The Court considered as representa-
tive claim 1 of the ‘623 Patent,74 which effectively claimed a method of
optimizing dosage comprising of: (1) administering a drug providing a
certain metabolite, (2) determining the blood level of that metabolite,
and (3) using the determined amount to adjust dosage.75 Prometheus
63. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 1 ll. 27–29.
64. Specifically, azathioprine (also known as Azasan or Imuran) and mercaptopurine
(also known as Purinethol or Purixan) are most commonly used for treatment of
IBD. Inflammatory Bowel Disease (IBD): Treatment and Drugs, MAYO CLINIC
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/inflammatory-bow
el-disease/basics/treatment/con-20034908 [https://perma.unl.edu/267D-VQK8].
The patents in question are specifically directed to dosage of 6-mercaptopurine
drugs. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 2 ll. 8–13; U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 col. 2 ll.
10–15.
65. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73.
66. Id.
67. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 1 ll. 66–67.
68. Side effects can include allergic reactions, neoplasia, opportunistic infections,
hepatitis, bone marrow suppression, and pancreatitis. Id. at col. 2 ll. 2–4.
69. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73–74.
70. Id.
71. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623; U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302.
72. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75.
73. Id. at 74.
74. Id. at 74–75.
75. Claim 1 of the ‘623 Patent states in full:
We claim:
1. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an im-
mune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having
said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108
red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug sub-
sequently administered to said subject and
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sells diagnostic tests that use the processes described in the patents.76
Mayo Clinic Rochester and Mayo Collaborative Services (collectively
Mayo) initially bought and used the tests sold by Prometheus but in
2004 announced that Mayo would begin using and selling its own sub-
stantially similar test.77 Prometheus claimed that Mayo’s test in-
fringed upon Prometheus’s patents.78 The Court also considered
whether the claims of Prometheus’s patents were patentable to begin
with,79 as discussed in the following section.
2. The Mayo Test
In determining the patentability of the claims of Prometheus’s pat-
ents, the Mayo court set forth a novel test. Under this new framework,
a court must first determine whether the claims are directed to a pat-
ent-ineligible concept.80 If so, there must be an inventive concept81
that transforms the nature of the claim.82 The inventive concept,
whether considering the elements of the claim individually or as an
“ordered combination,”83 must “ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law it-
self.”84 Such an inventive concept requires more than “simply stat[ing]
the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’ ”85
The Supreme Court determined that Prometheus’s patents did not
pass this test.86 The Court agreed that the test applied because the
correlation between blood metabolite concentration and appropriate
dosage is a patent-ineligible law of nature.87 However, the patents
failed to satisfy the second step. The first stage of the claimed method,
administering the drug, only directs the relevant audience—namely
doctors who use thiopurine drugs—to treat patients for certain dis-
eases.88 The portion of the claim stating whether the metabolite con-
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per
8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said
drug subsequently administered to said subject.
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 20 ll. 10–25.
76. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 77.
80. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375 (2015); see Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77.
81. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71–72.
82. Id. at 78.
83. Id. at 79.
84. Id. at 73.
85. Id. at 72 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)).
86. Id. at 92.
87. Id. at 77. This satisfies step one of the framework—whether the claims are di-
rected to a patent-ineligible concept—prompting the Court to consider whether
the claims contain an inventive concept.
88. Id. at 78.
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centration indicates a need to increase or decrease the dosage simply
tells a doctor about the relevant natural laws, adding nothing to the
law itself.89 Furthermore, the step of determining the blood level of
the metabolite indicates the use of “whatever process the doctor or the
laboratory wishes to use,” which is an unpatentable “conventional or
obvious pre-solution activity.”90 Nor was the Court convinced by con-
sidering the steps as an ordered combination: “Anyone who wants to
make use of these laws must first administer a thiopurine drug and
measure the resulting metabolite concentrations, and so the combina-
tion amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to doc-
tors to apply the applicable laws when treating their patients.”91 For
these reasons, the claims lacked an inventive concept and were insuf-
ficient to “transform unpatentable natural correlations into patenta-
ble applications of those regularities.”92
C. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International93
The Supreme Court solidified the Mayo framework in Alice and ex-
tended its applicability to abstract ideas.94 The patents at issue in Al-
ice were directed to mitigating “settlement risk,” which is “the risk
that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy
its obligation.”95 The patents claimed the use of a computer system to
track debits and credits of two parties to a financial exchange.96 The
system only allows transactions for which the system’s records “indi-
cate sufficient resources to satisfy their mutual obligations.”97 By only
allowing transactions for which a party has sufficient assets, the sys-
tem mitigates the risk that only one party will carry out its contrac-
tual obligations.98
The Court determined that the patents at issue satisfied only the
first step of the Mayo analysis. The first requirement was met because
the patents were properly directed to a patent-ineligible abstract
idea.99 Specifically, the concept of intermediated settlement—using a
third party to mitigate risk—is a common practice that is “squarely
89. Id. The Court effectively stated that the claims laid out the applicable law of
nature—namely the correlation between metabolite concentration and drug effi-
cacy—and told doctors to “apply it,” a practice which the Court has explicitly
stated is not sufficient to produce an inventive concept. See id. at 72.
90. Id. at 79 (modifications omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 80.
93. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
94. Id. at 2355.
95. Id. at 2352.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Lourie, J., concurring)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2356.
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within the realm of ‘abstract ideas.”100 However, the Court deter-
mined that the patents lacked an inventive concept: “[T]he mere reci-
tation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”101 Since the claims do
no more than “simply instruct the practitioner to implement the ab-
stract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer,”102 the
Court held the claims to be patent ineligible under § 101.103
D. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.104
Ariosa was a pivotal case in judicial application of the Mayo frame-
work. After a reasonably anticipated result in Alice, Ariosa strictly—
perhaps too strictly105—interpreted the Mayo standard to preclude
processes aimed at the discovery of a novel natural phenomenon. This
section lays out the facts of Ariosa and details the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of the Mayo framework. Part III will go on to analyze
whether the Federal Circuit properly interpreted Mayo.
1. Facts
The patented invention in Ariosa, commercialized by Sequenom as
its MaterniT21 test,106 was aimed at screening for fetal abnormalities
and determining sex.107 Traditionally, these types of tests have been
carried out by invasive techniques, including amniocentesis.108 Amni-
ocentesis and other invasive tests create risks for the mother and the
pregnancy.109 Some techniques have emerged which test maternal
blood or serum to screen for various fetal abnormalities, but these
techniques are expensive or time-consuming.110 Unlike existing blood
tests, the patent is built upon the researchers’ recent discovery that
100. Id. at 2356–57.
101. Id. at 2358.
102. Id. at 2359.
103. Id. at 2360.
104. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
105. See infra Part III.
106. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1373.
107. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 1 ll. 6–14.
108. Id. at col. 1 ll. 12–15. Amniocentesis is a procedure in which a physician inserts a
needle through the abdominal wall and uterus to extract amniotic fluid for test-
ing. Amniocentesis: What You Can Expect, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 30, 2015), http://
www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/amniocentesis/basics/what-you-can-expect/
prc-20014529 [https://perma.unl.edu/NX9W-76X4]. Amniocentesis procedures in-
clude many risks, including a slight risk of miscarriage or infection. Amni-
ocentesis: Risks, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-
procedures/amniocentesis/basics/risks/prc-20014529 [https://perma.unl.edu/E2L
6-NPA2].
109. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 1 ll. 15–16.
110. Id. at col. 1 ll. 18–37.
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fetal DNA111 can be detected in maternal serum or plasma sam-
ples.112 This cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) circulates freely in a preg-
nant woman’s bloodstream.113 The finding of fetal DNA in plasma was
unexpected since plasma is routinely discarded in other noninvasive
procedures.114
The patent does not claim cffDNA;115 nor could it.116 Rather, the
patent claims certain methods of using cffDNA.117 The patent de-
scribes a process by which to collect cffDNA in order to perform tests
for fetal abnormalities. In this process, health professionals take a
small amount of plasma from maternal blood using standard tech-
niques.118 They then extract nucleic acids from the sample by one of a
number of suitable methods.119 Finally, they amplify the fetal DNA
sequences in the sample by a standard nucleic-acid amplification sys-
tem, preferably polymerase chain reaction.120 The method can be used
to determine sex,121 detect any paternally-inherited genetic sequences
111. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is made up of hereditary information in the form of
genes. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2111 (2013). DNA is generally found in the form of a double helix consisting of
chemically joined nucleotides. Id. Sequences of nucleotides serve as instructions
for a cell to build proteins. Id. Human genes are present in cells in twenty-three
pairs of chromosomes. Id. Changes to the nucleotide sequence are called “muta-
tions.” Id. at 2112. Mutations vary greatly in their effect but can cause disease or
an increased risk of disease. Id.
112. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 1 ll. 50–51.
113. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
114. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 1 ll. 51–54.
115. See id.
116. See Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (holding that naturally occurring segments
of DNA are not patentable).
117. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1373. Specifically, the claims at issue on appeal are claims 1,
2, 4, 5, 8, 19–22, 24, and 25, id., which involve “[a] method for detecting a pater-
nally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin performed on a maternal serum or
plasma sample from a pregnant female,” as well as several variations on the
method and other related techniques. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 23 ll. 60–63.
At the core of this dispute is claim 21, which provides a method for prenatal diag-
nosis of certain conditions performed by separating a maternal blood sample into
a cellular and a noncellular fraction, detecting cffDNA in the noncellular fraction,
and “providing a diagnosis based on the presence and/or quantity and/or se-
quence of the [cffDNA].” Id. at col. 26 1 ll. 14–15.
118. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 2 ll. 19–27.
119. Id. at col. 2 ll. 27–41.
120. Id. at col. 2 ll. 42–47. Polymerase chain reaction—commonly referred to as PCR—
is a method in which the two strands of the DNA helix are separated and copied.
The DNA strands are copied by DNA polymerase, which carries out the same
function within human cells. The process is set up to be cyclic in nature, allowing
for rapid amplification of the original DNA sample. See R.K. Saiki et al., Enzy-
matic Amplification of Beta-Globin Genomic Sequences and Restriction Site Anal-
ysis for Diagnosis of Sickle Cell Anemia, 230 SCIENCE 1350 (1985); F. Sanger &
A.R. Coulson, A Rapid Method for Determining Sequences in DNA by Primed
Synthesis with DNA Polymerase, 94 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 441 (1975).
121. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 2 ll. 48–56.
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not possessed by the mother,122 screen for Down’s Syndrome,123 and
catch other chromosomal aneuploidies.124 The MaterniT21 test mar-
keted by Sequenom created a safer alternative for fetal testing com-
pared to invasive techniques.125
Ariosa Diagnostics (Ariosa) and Natera produce substantially simi-
lar tests to Sequenom’s MaterniT21.126 Sequenom claimed that the
tests made by Ariosa and Natera infringed the ‘540 Patent.127 Ariosa
and Natera filed separate declaratory actions, alleging that they did
not infringe.128 After various procedural steps,129 the district court
determined that the claims in the ‘540 Patent did not satisfy the Mayo
test and noted concerns that the claims posed a risk of preempting a
natural phenomenon.130 Sequenom appealed to the Federal
Circuit.131
2. The Federal Circuit’s Decision
Upon review, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court
that the claims at issue in the ‘540 Patent are ineligible for protection
under § 101.132 Method claims—such as those claimed in the ‘540 Pat-
ent—are generally patentable.133 However, since the method begins
and ends with cffDNA, which is unquestionably a natural phenome-
122. Id. at col. 2 ll. 57–61.
123. See Down Syndrome: Definition, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.mayo
clinic.org/diseases-conditions/down-syndrome/basics/definition/con-20020948
[https://perma.unl.edu/N75S-YTVV] (“Down syndrome is a genetic disorder
caused when abnormal cell division results in extra genetic material from chro-
mosome 21. This genetic disorder, which varies in severity, causes lifelong intel-
lectual disability and developmental delays, and in some people it causes health
problems.”).
124. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 3 ll. 25–28. An aneuploidy is an abnormal number
of chromosomes in an individual. Chromosomal aneuploidy may cause any num-
ber of conditions, the most common of which is Down syndrome. See A.J.F. GRIF-
FITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS (7th ed. 2000), http://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK21870.
125. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
126. Ariosa produces the Harmony Test, which diagnoses certain fetal characteristics.
Id. at 1374. Natera produces the Non-Invasive Paternity Test, which is used to
determine paternity of a fetus. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1374–75.
130. Id. at 1375; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (invalidating
a patent on a computer process for converting binary-coded decimal numbers into
pure binary numerals because the patent “would wholly pre-empt the mathemat-
ical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself”).
131. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1375.
132. Id. at 1380.
133. Id. at 1376.
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non,134 the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.135 As
such, the claims easily satisfy the first step of the Mayo test.136
Because the claims are directed to naturally occurring phenomena,
the court proceeded to step two of the Mayo framework, which re-
quires an inventive concept.137 The court found essential the fact that
the use of methods like polymerase chain reaction for amplification of
DNA was “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.”138 The
court stated that the methods claimed in the ‘540 Patent essentially
amount to “a general instruction to doctors to apply routine, conven-
tional techniques when seeking to detect cffDNA.”139 According to the
court, this clearly means that the method of detecting paternally in-
herited cffDNA is not new and useful.140
The court acknowledged that the discovery of cffDNA in maternal
plasma or serum—as opposed to the method for its analysis—is new
and useful,141 but was still not convinced that it passed muster under
the Mayo framework. The main reason that the court came to this con-
clusion was that the claims were broad examples of techniques for de-
tecting cffDNA in maternal plasma.142 The court asserted that:
[A]ppending routine, conventional steps to a natural phenomenon, specified at
a high level of generality, is not enough to supply an inventive concept. Where
claims of a method patent are directed to an application that starts and ends
with a naturally occurring phenomenon, the patent fails to disclose patent
eligible subject matter if the methods themselves are conventional, routine
and well understood applications in the art.143
The court noted that preemption analysis was unnecessary, since it is
inherent in the § 101 analysis.144
The court also addressed other arguments put forth by Sequenom.
Sequenom maintained that prior to the ‘540 Patent, maternal plasma
or serum was being used by no one to detect cffDNA.145 The court
replied that Sequenom’s argument “implie[d] that the inventive con-
134. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
135. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376.
136. See supra section II.B.2.
137. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376.
138. Id. at 1377.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1378.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1379. See generally subsection II.A.1. However, preemption also plays a
role in defining the inventive concept, since the inventive concept arises out of the
general § 101 inquiry. See subsection II.A.2. If the court had properly recognized
the role preemption plays in the inventive concept analysis, see generally infra
section III.A., perhaps it may have been more inclined to recognize an inventive
concept here. But see infra note 147.
145. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
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cept lies in the discovery of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum.”146
However, whether or not the inventive concept is taken to be such, the
court stated that the ‘540 Patent does not claim this invention, and
the argument is irrelevant.147 Furthermore, Sequenom argued that
the invention is a “significant human contribution.”148 The court ac-
knowledged the importance of the invention, but rejoined that
“[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”149 The Federal Circuit denied rehear-
ing en banc,150 and the Supreme Court denied Sequenom’s petition for
writ of certiorari.151
III. ANALYSIS
The key concern arising out of Ariosa is that “a too restrictive test
for patent eligibility under . . . § 101 with respect to laws of na-
ture . . . may discourage development and disclosure of new diagnostic
and therapeutic methods in the life sciences, which are often driven by
discovery of new and natural phenomena.”152 Mayo breathed new life
into the inventive concept but did little to alter its traditional inven-
tive concept framework. Despite the open door that the Supreme
Court left in Mayo, the Federal Circuit very narrowly defined the in-
ventive concept and refused to recognize discovery of laws of nature as
a sufficient inventive concept. This Part begins with a discussion of
the inventive concept requirement and how Mayo affects it. This Part
then goes on to clarify why discovery of a law of nature should—in-
deed, must—qualify as an inventive concept. Finally, this Part ana-
lyzes the consequences and aftermath of the Federal Circuit’s
decision.
146. Id.
147. Id. But see Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1289–90
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Dyk, J., concurring) (assuming that the inventive concept may
arise out of the discovery of a law of nature without claiming the discovery itself).
Note again that the court did in fact agree that the discovery of cffDNA in mater-
nal plasma or serum was new and useful, Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1377, but the court
circumvented a full analysis of the issue by stating that the ‘540 Patent did not
technically claim the discovery of cffDNA. But cf. infra note 169.
148. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
149. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Ge-
netics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013)).
150. Ariosa, 809 F.3d 1282.
151. Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
152. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring).
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A. The Inventive Concept After Mayo
The Court in Mayo did not define what constitutes an inventive
concept beyond citation to precedent.153 This precedent reveals that
the Court has no set formula for determining what constitutes an in-
ventive concept.154 So long as a patent does not claim ineligible sub-
ject matter itself, the inventive concept is satisfied if the process
“transforms” the process into something patentable.155 The Court has
provided several instances where such a transformation is present156
and noted that post-solution activity is not sufficient.157 At the same
time, the Court has explicitly stated that precedent does not provide
an exhaustive list.158 The inventive concept analysis more generally
focuses on preemption159 and novelty.160 So long as an invention pro-
vides some new and useful process and does not broadly prevent use of
an unpatentable principle, the inventive concept is satisfied.161
Seemingly ignoring Benson and Flook, the Federal Circuit incor-
rectly interpreted Mayo to restrict the inventive concept narrowly as
to exclude detection of cffDNA in maternal plasma.162 Rather, Mayo
only holds that instructions to doctors to adjust drug dosage based on
metabolite levels does not qualify as an inventive concept.163 Again,
judicial precedent does not provide a comprehensive catalogue of ap-
propriate inventive concepts.164 Mayo does nothing more to alter the
inventive concept than to provide an additional example of a nonquali-
fying process.165
153. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73
(2012) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); and then citing Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)). See generally Casey, supra note 25.
154. See supra subsection II.A.2.
155. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
156. See id. at 70–71.
157. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (“The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a
patentable process exalts form over substance.”)
158. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (“We do not hold that no process patent could ever
qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.”).
159. See id. at 72 (“[I]f the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-
empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself.”).
160. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591 (“The process itself, not merely the mathematical al-
gorithm, must be new and useful.”).
161. For example, the Mayo Court acknowledged that a process for molding rubber
contained an inventive concept because it did not preempt use of the Arrhenius
equation and “transformed the process into an inventive application of the
formula.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
80–81 (2012).
162. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
163. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82.
164. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
165. Mayo in no way attempts to add to, detract from, or modify inventive concept
jurisprudence. See generally supra subsection II.B.2.
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B. Discovery as an Inventive Concept
The inventive concept of the Mayo analysis can and should be sat-
isfied by the discovery of a law of nature itself.166 This section begins
with a discussion of how discovery fits into the existing framework of
the inventive concept. This section goes on to address the Federal Cir-
cuit’s concerns with adopting this approach and concludes with a dis-
cussion of the strong public policy supporting discovery as a sufficient
inventive concept.
1. Conformity with the Inventive Concept Framework
Discovery of a law of nature fits neatly within the existing inven-
tive concept analysis promulgated by the Supreme Court. As noted
above, the Court’s approach focuses strongly on preemption and nov-
elty.167 The Court in Myriad has already implied “that an inventive
concept can sometimes come from discovery of an unknown natural
phenomenon, not just from unconventional application of a phenome-
non.”168 Here, the discovery of the previously unknown presence of
cffDNA in maternal blood is clearly such a discovery that would war-
rant designation as an inventive concept. The discovery is obviously
novel, and use of the cffDNA to perform genetic tests for diagnosis of
certain conditions does not preempt use of cffDNA in other inventions
for other purposes.
Of course, a newly discovered law of nature should not itself be
patentable.169 However, the primary concern regarding patents of
laws of nature is preempting use of that principle.170 This concern is
of little consequence since it falls squarely within the balancing act of
the entirety of patent law. While questions of preemption and other
limitations on future innovation must be taken into consideration, the
goal of patent law has always been “[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
166. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“[A]n inventive concept can come not just from crea-
tive, unconventional application of a natural law, but also from the creativity and
novelty of the discovery of the law itself.”). However, Judge Dyk incorrectly sur-
mises that Mayo “concludes that [an] inventive concept cannot come from discov-
ering something new in nature.” Id. As discussed supra, Mayo is not as restrictive
as the justices of the Federal Circuit have made it out to be.
167. See supra subsection II.A.2.
168. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1290 (Dyk, J., concurring); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pa-
thology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (stating that, al-
though patents on cDNA were invalid, “patents on new applications of knowledge
about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes” were not precluded by the decision).
169. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1290 (Dyk, J., concurring); see supra subsection II.A.1. This is
precisely why the ‘540 Patent did not claim discovery of cffDNA in maternal
plasma and serum. Rather than disregard the discovery because the patent did
not explicitly claim it, the court should have featured this new and useful discov-
ery more centrally in its inventive concept analysis. Cf. supra note 147.
170. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1290 (Dyk, J., concurring).
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ence and useful Arts.”171 The aim of the inventive concept is to con-
sider this balancing act in awarding patents for inventions directed at
traditionally unpatentable subject matter. A patent cannot issue for
gravity or mathematical equations or DNA.172 Such patents would be
overly broad and unduly limit the access of citizens to the very funda-
mentals of thought and nature. However, failure to issue a patent for
discovery of a law of nature may be just as restrictive on access to the
“building blocks of human ingenuity.”173 Without incentives, scien-
tists may not be able to obtain funding to pursue research in the life
sciences. Without life science discoveries, laypersons cannot access
medical tests and treatments that may very well be lifesaving. In the
complicated and necessary world of life science research, patent pro-
tection is vital.
Generally speaking, “an invention arises when there is a degree of
mental effort or observation, or an amount of work greater than what
is given by the average journeyman in the art to such problems.”174
Furthermore,
where there has been an inhibition in the minds of workers in the art or belief
that a certain thing could not be done or could not be done a certain way, and
when thereafter someone comes along and shows the error of that way of
thinking and achieves a successful result, the presence of invention is rather
plainly indicated.175
Although not judicially ordained, this formulation of an invention is
common sense. Patent protection must extend to discoveries that were
previously thought unfeasible, which is clearly demonstrated by the
use of a mother’s blood to carry out genetic testing of her fetus. Even if
happenstance, this discovery clearly has sufficient “novelty and
value”176 for an inventive concept, thus entitling it to patent protec-
tion. While a patent cannot broadly claim all uses of the discovery,177
the discovery itself is plainly a sufficient inventive concept to render
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
172. See Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980).
173. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
174. CHESTER H. BIESTERFELD, PATENT LAW FOR LAWYERS, STUDENTS, CHEMISTS AND
ENGINEERS 4 (2d ed. 1949).
175. Id. at 7.
176. See id. at 8 (“Invention involves a mental effort or concept, and in its higher forms
a ‘flash of genius,’ and the fundamental rule is that it must transcend what the
average journeyman in the art would do in view of the problem presented. A dis-
covery, such a devising a new chemical process, involves the same kind of mental
effort, but there are some types of chemical discoveries that are the result of acci-
dent, or unexpected occurrence in the course of other operations. Here we cannot
so readily apply the rule of the average journeyman in the art, but must rather
judge the discovery from the standpoint of its novelty and value.”).
177. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (stating that preemption of
use of a law of nature must be avoided).
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patentable specific claims invoking the newly discovered law of
nature.
2. Addressing the Federal Circuit’s Concerns
In its review of Ariosa, the Federal Circuit presented concerns that
the claims utilize common techniques and that the claims were overly
broad. Each of these concerns is easily dismissed. The use of “routine”
and “conventional”178 techniques has traditionally persuaded courts
that an invention lacks an inventive concept. However, in setting out
the Mayo standard, the Supreme Court acknowledged that an inven-
tive concept could be realized in the use of an existing drug in a new
way.179 Later, in its specific consideration of patents involving DNA,
the Court also implied that an inventive concept could arise from “new
applications of knowledge about . . . genes.”180 The Supreme Court
obviously recognizes that an inventive concept may not always arise
from application of new techniques but rather from application of ex-
isting techniques to a new discovery. With such a robust library of life
sciences methods already developed, the future of research lies in ap-
plication of these routine and conventional processes to solve newly
discovered problems. It is only logical to recognize these inventions as
containing an inventive concept in order to support the development of
new life science innovations.
Beyond the focus on routine and conventional steps, the Federal
Circuit also seemed to be concerned with reining in overly broad
claims.181 Breadth is of particular concern where an inventive concept
may arise out of discovery, which may “extend far beyond the utility
demonstrated by the patent”182 such that they “ ‘preempt the use’ of
the underlying idea by others.”183 These concerns of preemption hail
back to the infancy of § 101.184 However, these very concerns of
178. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed Cir.
2015) (“[A]ppending routine, conventional steps to a natural phenomenon . . . is
not enough to supply an inventive concept.”).
179. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 87 (2012).
180. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120
(2013).
181. See Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1378 (“[A]ppending routine, conventional steps to a natu-
ral phenomenon, specified at a high level of generality, is not enough to supply an
inventive concept.” (emphasis added)).
182. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Dyk, J., concurring).
183. Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
184. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (“A patent is not
good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all
other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by
creating monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures, against the
avowed policy of the patent laws.”).
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breadth are already explicitly addressed in § 112.185 It is quite clear
that patent law already prohibits patents which lay out claims at a
“high level of generality.”186 Here, as always, preemption is the ulti-
mate concern. The distinction to be made is the point in patent analy-
sis at which the breadth of the claim should be considered. As to
subject matter, a direct claim to the law of nature, natural phenome-
non, or abstract idea itself would preempt use of the underlying law or
idea and should defeat the inventive concept analysis. However, ques-
tions of breadth, concerned that the patent claims are not narrowly
focused on the claimed invention, are better examined by the “finer
filter of § 112 . . . rather than reviewing them under the less-defined
eligibility rules.”187 Although a claim may run into trouble at § 112
down the line, the mere breadth of a claim does not demonstrate that
it contains patent-ineligible subject matter.
3. Public Policy
The foregoing analysis aside, the Federal Circuit would be well-
advised to interpret the vague language of Mayo in a way that is con-
sistent with the intents and purposes of patent law itself.188 Patent
law exists to incentivize innovation.189 Such incentives are beneficial
for inventors and the public alike. Inventors see their blood, sweat,
and tears repaid in the exclusive ownership of rights in their inven-
tion for a period of years.190 The public likewise benefits as scientists,
confident in future patent protections and building on previously dis-
closed inventions, continue to pursue new ideas, churning out cutting-
edge technology and medical breakthroughs.191 This incentive is par-
ticularly powerful in the area of life sciences, simultaneously allowing
inventors to make abundant profits and bringing about new ways for
the public to live longer, happier, and healthier lives.
185. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor
of carrying out the invention.”).
186. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1378.
187. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring).
188. See BALLARD, supra note 9, at 21–26 (discussing the purpose of patents).
189. See id. at 24–25 (“So then it is the fact of granting of patents in appropriate cases
that promotes the progress of science and the useful arts, not something done
with them afterwards.”).
190. See id. at 25 (“Human nature being what it is, the public cannot expect to get
many new inventions unless it offers a fair price for them, a price which holds
some promise of profit on the time, risk and expense of the inventor.”).
191. See id. at 22 (“The thing that benefits the public is the full and detailed disclosure
of the invention in a permanent public record with the privilege of using the in-
vention freely after the limited term.”).
242 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:221
While Mayo certainly does not prohibit the Federal Circuit from
adopting a narrow construction of the inventive concept, it is exceed-
ingly unwise to do so. Life sciences innovation is essential to continued
progress in medical sciences. As discussed below, the growth of gene
technology, the necessity for access to genetic information for its de-
velopment, and incentives to invest in this highly useful technology
support a broad inventive concept in order to promote innovation.192
First, “[g]enetic information is the basis for the coming era of per-
sonalized medicine, a nascent industry that requires patents to pro-
mote investment and development.”193 As research in the area of life
sciences progresses, science is becoming increasingly able to imple-
ment personalized medicine, use genetic testing to predict the onset of
diseases, and make better therapeutic choices.194 The human genome
is used in a multitude of applications, many—if not most—of which
depend on the identification of underlying natural laws.195 However,
without proper patent protection, further developments are unlikely
to be “effectively developed into viable commercial products.”196 The
inventive concept standard adopted by the Federal Circuit acts as a
“complete ban” on the important claims at issue in this case.197 The
result is “uncertainty in [the life sciences] industry, a reduced likeli-
hood of patent protection, and concomitant reduced incentives for in-
vestment and public disclosure” that is certainly at odds with the
constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”198
Second, broadly applying the Federal Circuit’s formulation of the
inventive concept “would promote suppression of genetic information
relevant to diagnostic and therapeutic applications.”199 Without the
availability of patent protection, researchers will likely turn to trade
secret protection for the most important discoveries.200 This will dis-
192. See generally Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants and in Favor of Reversal at 4, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 2014-1139, 2014-1142,
2014-1144) [hereinafter Biotechnology Brief].
193. Id.
194. Id. at 4–5. Diagnostic testing, predictive and pre-symptomatic testing, carrier
testing, prenatal testing, newborn screening, pharmacogenomics testing, and re-
search genetic testing can provide a plethora of information that is beneficial for
both individuals and the progress of medicine as a whole. See Frequently Asked
Questions About Genetic Testing, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.genome.gov/19516567/#al-3 [https://perma.unl.edu/KPM2-EW7J].
195. Biotechnology Brief, supra note 192, at 5.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 6. If researchers do not resort to trade secret or some other alternative,
nonpatented inventions will quickly lose their value as they are stolen by compet-
itors and unable to be easily licensed, sold, or transferred. See What Happens If
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courage publication of important techniques that might be beneficial
for current use or lead to discovery of better diagnostics or therapeutic
methods. Incentives to move to trade secret protections cut directly
against the goal of disclosure that is fundamental to patent protec-
tion.201 This is especially troubling considering that genetic testing
could serve as an indicator of risk for “diabetes, cardiovascular dis-
ease, autism, Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, immunological
disorders, asthma, and most form of cancers.”202 Indeed, “it can be
expected that most human diseases will involve many genes or other
biological markers.”203 The genetic studies to date are only the begin-
ning of molecular-diagnostics technology204 and are in great need of
patent protection. Without it, incentives to disclose innovations will be
practically nonexistent, greatly hindering progress in genetic diagnos-
tics205 and hampering patient access to the most effective methods.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, “[l]ack of patent protection
will reduce investment in diagnostic methods and preclude the effec-
tive use of genetic information for preventing and treating human dis-
ease.”206 The costs of gene diagnostics of even simple genetically
You Do Not Patent Your Inventions?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www
.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/importance/risks.htm [https://perma.unl/6BUE-
5WSB]; see also Worth Wade, History of the American Patent Incentive System, 44
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 67, 70 (1962) (“Patents avoid the necessity for secrecy. It is
difficult to maintain trade secrets or prevent their unauthorized use, when ex-
posed. Inventions should not be treated like money in a miser’s sock; they should
be put in safe-keeping in the U.S. Patent Office.”).
201. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
252 (2d ed. 2012) (“[T]he grant of a patent is often described as a quid pro quo or
bargain, with the patentee receiving exclusive rights to his or her invention for a
limited time in exchange for the disclosure to the public of how to make and use
the invention.”); Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 166, 178 (1948) (discussing disclosure as a duty, rather than a “mere right
to report”).
202. Biotechnology Brief, supra note 192, at 7–8 (citations omitted); see also What Are
Genome-Wide Association Studies?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://
ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/gwastudies [https://perma.unl.edu/
6ZY3-VB67] (noting that studies of single nucleotide polymorphisms have con-
tributed to knowledge about diabetes, heart abnormalities, Parkinson’s disease,
and Crohn’s disease).
203. Biotechnology Brief, supra note 192, at 8.
204. Id.; see also What Are the Next Steps in Genomic Research?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF
MED. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/nextsteps
[https://perma.unl.edu/2UJJ-VFL7] (discussing the wide range of future goals for
genetic research); What Is Pharmacogenomics?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED. (Apr.
11, 2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/pharmacogenomics
[https://perma.unl.edu/8DWT-QAHR] (discussing the nascent field of
pharmacogenomics, which focuses on how drug response is affected by genetics).
205. Biotechnology Brief, supra note 192, at 8–9.
206. Id. at 9. Privately funded research tends to give rise to the most commercially
valuable innovations. Without the “assurance that [innovators] can recoup their
investments,” private investors are unlikely fund innovation in the first place.
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related diseases can stretch into the hundreds of millions of dollars.207
As the complexity of genetic links for diseases increases—such as ge-
netic interactions associated with diabetes, heart disease, and some
forms of cancer—companies will have to make an even more substan-
tial investment to commercialize future genetic diagnostic testing.208
“Developing new drugs is a risky, lengthy, and costly endeavor,”209
and it is irrational to think that companies will undertake these risks
without patent protection as a basis for a financially reasonable re-
turn on their investment.210 This concern has been essential to patent
law from its very origins in Venice.211 As investors become wary of
financing high-risk research with no guarantee of patent protection,
life sciences innovation may indeed come to a grinding stop, greatly
limiting patient access to potentially lifesaving developments.
In sum, it is essential to encourage continued innovation in the life
sciences. Of all subject matter within the purview of patent law, life
See Omar Al Ubaydli, Economics 101: Privately Funded Research and Develop-
ment Leads to the Most Useful Innovation, THE NAT’L, Oct. 15, 2016, http://www
.thenational.ae/business/economy/economics-101-privately-funded-research-and-
development-leads-to-the-most-useful-innovation [https://perma.unl.edu/H6JB-
NJ3V].
207. Biotechnology Brief, supra note 192, at 9 n.18.
208. Id. at 9–10.
209. Id. at 10 (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.
2012)); see also id. (“Only one in every 5,000 medicines tested for the potential to
treat illness is eventually approved for patient use, and studies estimate that
developing a new drug takes 10 to 15 years and costs more than $1.3 billion.”
(quoting Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1300)); id. at 11 (“In addition, recent efforts
by the FDA to regulate offerings by genetic diagnostics companies implicate addi-
tional costs . . . that can be expected to significantly increase as this industry
develops.”); Kim Thomas, The Price of Health: The Cost of Developing New
Medicines, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 30, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/health-
care-network/2016/mar/30/new-drugs-development-costs-pharma [https://perma
.unl.edu/A2MC-RB2U] (describing the process of developing a drug).
210. Biotechnology Brief, supra note 192, at 10; cf. American Patent Incentive System,
40 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 187, 187–88 (1958) (“This incentive, hope or reward, or
encouragement, which can be gained for said ‘limited times’ has caused inventors
and discoverers and their financial backers to expend the time, energy and funds
to develop and to produce their inventions, etc., and to avail themselves of the
protection of patent.”); see also id. at 189–90 (discussing the strong incentives
inherent in patent protection). Even if the traditional notion of patent incentives
is generally a fiction, as suggested by Professor Eric Johnson, see generally Eric
E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
623 (2012), life sciences innovations rather plainly fall into the exception by any
measure. Cf. id. at 661–66. The life sciences business is certainly one of those
“certain industries” that relies heavily on patents to profit from inventions. See
id. at 663.
211. Cf. Mandich, supra note 201, at 176 (“[I]f provision were made for the works and
devices discovered by such persons, so that others who may see them could not
build them and take the inventor’s honor away, more men would then apply their
genius, would discover, and would build devices of great utility and benefit to our
commonwealth.” (quoting the Venetian Patent Act of 1474)).
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science inventions have perhaps the most direct and beneficial impact
upon individual lives. The judiciary—indeed, the government as a
whole—has a moral obligation to promote development in this area to
improve the lives of people around the world. With a narrow interpre-
tation of the inventive concept, the Federal Circuit takes a treacher-
ous step down an exceedingly slippery slope that is sure to effectively
halt life sciences innovation.
C. Implications for Patentability
Ariosa has not been well received,212 and rightly so. Although the
inventive concept standard was never required to be narrowly ap-
plied,213 the Federal Circuit’s opinion has now made the Mayo stan-
dard as overwhelmingly restrictive as the judges feared it to be. The
repercussions—of which many can be imagined—have already begun
to manifest themselves. For example, the Federal Circuit used this
enhanced inventive concept standard to strike down a method based
on the discovery that certain DNA sequences within a gene are linked
to certain noncoding regions of DNA.214 The court stated that “the
physical steps of DNA amplification and analysis of the amplified
DNA to provide a user with the sequence of the non-coding region do
not, individually or in combination, provide sufficient inventive con-
cept to render [the claim] patent eligible.”215 Due to Ariosa’s focus on
the patent ineligibility of routine and conventional methods, the Fed-
eral Circuit again glossed over the obvious inventive concept in the
discovery of the utility of noncoding regions which had previously been
considered “junk DNA.”216
As the Federal Circuit continues to strike down patents on inven-
tions aimed at discoveries of novel and useful phenomena in the life
sciences, the incentive to invent in these areas is likely to dry up.
Without a reasonable expectation of patent protection, it will become
increasingly difficult for researchers to obtain funding for life sciences
research that is exceedingly costly. Without funding, research will
212. See, e.g., Devlin Hartline, Federal Circuit Should Reconsider Ariosa v. Sequenom:
The Panel Decision Threatens Modern Innovation, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 30, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/30/federal-circuit-should-reconsider-ariosa-
v-sequenom-the-panel-decision-threatens-modern-innovation/id=61171; Sue D.
Nym, Ariosa Is a Good Example of Outcome-Driven § 101 Decisions, IP WATCH-
DOG (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/09/ariosa-is-a-good-ex-
ample-of-outcome-driven-§-101-decisions/id=60433; Patent Publius, Federal
Circuit Threatens Innovation: Dissecting the Ariosa v. Sequenom Opinion, CTR.
FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (June 23, 2015), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2015/06/23/
federal-circuit-threatens-innovation-dissecting-the-sequenom-v-ariosa-opinion
[https://perma.unl.edu/W2X7-CAPW].
213. See supra section III.A.
214. Genetic Techs., Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
215. Id. at 1377.
216. Id. at 1372.
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surely shift to other areas for which scientists can obtain grants,
bringing life sciences innovation to a standstill. Whether the inventive
concept was born out of sound jurisprudence or not, the reality is that
Ariosa will have grave effects on the ground.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the nation’s inception, U.S. courts have carefully walked the
line between incentivizing innovation and not unduly limiting access
to scientific principles. Mayo itself continued to tread carefully, never
limiting the “innovative concept” so far that motivation to create, de-
sign, and discover is extinguished. Nonetheless, in Ariosa, the Federal
Circuit took one step too far, effectively cutting off any incentive for
future innovation in the life sciences. Unless and until the Federal
Circuit recognizes the error of its ways—or is instructed to do so by
the Supreme Court—Ariosa sets a dangerous stage for the life sci-
ences. The inventive concept that arises from Ariosa may have grim
consequences in the years to come.
